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Article 7

Victorian
Savages
Kathy Alexis Psomiades
Darwin and the Memory of the
Human: Evolution, Savages, and
South America by Cannon Schmitt.
Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009. Pp. 260, 5 illustrations.
$90.00 cloth.

Darwin and the Memory of the Human: Evolution, Savages, and South
America is a beautifully written, elegantly conceived contribution to
the study of nineteenth-century
evolutionary theory’s cultural implications. Taking as its object four
writers—the evolutionary thinkers Charles Darwin and Alfred
Russell Wallace, the writer and
clergyman Charles Kingsley, and
the early-twentieth-century botanist and adventure novel writer
W. H. Hudson—three of whom
worked in biology and natural history, two of whom ventured into
fiction, and all of whom wrote
about or around South America,
Cannon Schmitt’s volume focuses
on moments in these texts when
savagery, South America, and
memory converge. Although the
texts he examines all detail experiences of South America (or in
Kingsley’s case, not quite getting to
South America), and all fall loosely
under the category of natural history, what interests Schmitt are the
moments when natural history becomes memoir, when writing about
life as defined by evolutionary biology intersects with what we call
life-writing: autobiographical accounts of significant personal experiences. Personal memory of a
personal past here intersects with
communal historical and evolutionary memories of the vast pasts
of the planet, of life, of humanity,
of England. This intersection between individual and collective
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pasts allows Schmitt to argue that
evolutionary theory necessitated
the invention of a new human
subject with a new relation to
memory, “a form of memory that
redefines what it is to be human
(as well as modern, civilized, and
British) in relation to the past, and
specifically those pasts—historical,
cultural, personal, and, above all,
evolutionary—conceived of as savage” (3). This form of memory,
Schmitt calls “savage mnemonics.”
And he sees it as part of the general
modern crisis of memory described
by Richard Terdiman in Present
Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis, which Schmitt describes thus:
Modernity came into being as
a self-consciously distinct historical period by way of the
distanciation of the present
from the past as well as from
its inability to recall or make
sense of that past. Modernity,
on this representation, resembles an amnesiac who can remember only the necessity of
recalling that which it might
never have known or experienced in the first place. (24)1
Whereas Terdiman, like other
contemporary memory theorists,
tends to focus on poets, novelists,
and other practitioners of the arts,
Schmitt asks about the role scientific ideas play in this crisis of
memory.
In the first chapter, Schmitt’s
focus is on the memory of Dar-

win’s encounter with the Fuegians
in South America in 1832, a memory that reoccurs at key moments
in his work from The Voyage of the
Beagle (1839) to the Autobiography
(1887, written in 1876). In the
1830s, Darwin writes, “Of individual objects, perhaps no one is more
certain to create astonishment than
the first sight in his native haunt of
a real barbarian, of man in his lowest and most savage state.”2 In the
1870s, he writes again, “The sight
of a naked savage in his native land
is an event which can never be forgotten.”3 These words of Darwin’s,
quoted and requoted by Schmitt,
resonate and gather meaning as
the chapter progresses. They reappear, differently arranged, in other
Darwin texts, as well—in particular the famous passage from the
end of Descent of Man:
The astonishment I felt upon
first seeing a party of Fuegians
on a wild and broken shore
will never be forgotten by
me, for the reflection at once
rushed into my mind—such
were our ancestors. . . . He
who has seen a savage in his
native land will not feel much
shame, if forced to acknowledge that the blood of some
more humble creature flows
in his veins.4
Schmitt contrasts the unforgettable memory of the savage in his native land with forgetting of the
death and destruction behind “the

	ON schmitt’s darwin
face of nature bright with gladness” that Darwin claims in Origin
human beings are prone to.5 People forget or disavow death, but
they cannot apparently forget the
disturbing sight of the savage.
Critics have written about the savage in Darwin before—focusing
particularly on his appearance in
Descent as the strange middle term
in the continuity Darwin posits between the animal and the human.
On the one hand, the savage is necessary to positing the evolution of
humans out of animals: he stands
in the place of the missing link. On
the other, the savage is also remarkably the huge exception to
that progression: unlike both animals and civilized people, and yet
undoubtedly human, he is the bad
example that incites readers to embrace their animal ancestry. In Descent to see oneself as descended
from a monkey becomes palatable
insofar as monkeys are more like
civilized people than savages are.
But what Schmitt adds to this discussion is a new sense of how the
savage keeps open the gap between
human and animal. In seeming to
bridge that gap, savages in their
exceptionality also maintain it:
they stand outside the very continuity between human and animal
that they make possible.
At a moment when other humans have been completely
assimilated to the natural
world, when the line between
human and non-human has
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been revealed to be a consolatory fiction, Fuegians
preserve human separateness. . . . Darwin’s memory of
“savages” on a wild and desolate shore should be understood as, among other things,
a memory of the last fully human being on earth. (56)
Whereas the memory of savages
allows Darwin to posit a continuity
between the animal and the human by constituting the savage as
both link and exception, Alfred
Russel Wallace’s “memories of
South American and Southeast
Asian indigenes lead to the conclusion that not they alone but rather
humans as such constitute an exception” (86). Focusing on Wallace’s descriptions of his first
encounters with “the Aborigines of
the Amazon,” encounters Wallace
paradoxically sees as both the fulfillment of his expectations and as
striking and new, Schmitt shows
how, for Wallace, the exceptional
nature of savages eventually extends to all human beings, exempting humanity from natural selection.
Unlike Darwin, Wallace experiences surprise and delight at his
first encounter, admiring the bodies, minds, and culture of a people
uncontaminated by “European
supervision.”6 Schmitt describes
Wallace’s experiences this way:
So startling that they required
he relearn to see, forgetting
all he thought he knew about
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them, savages were also so
familiar as to confirm the existence of a world wholly distinct from that of “civilized”
Europe—a world whose enviable harmonious social arrangements Wallace was, for
a time, able to share. (81)
This admiration would lead
Wallace to claim, in an 1868 review
of Lyell’s Principles of Geology, that
savage brains and bodies exceed
their survival needs and so could
not have been produced by natural
selection without some supernatural help. Because savage humanity
can be remembered as so delightful, so much in excess of necessity,
so much less animalistic than corrupt civilized modernity, it restores
the very category of a humanity
separate from the animal kingdom. It also operates as a critique
of the inhumanity of European
civilization and conquest. If for
Darwin the savage is paradoxically
more debased than the animals
from whom civilized man has
sprung, for Wallace the savage is
paradoxically more magnificently
human than the degenerated products of civilization. Thus, Schmitt
claims, “[T]o remember the savage
is also to remember what the human once was and thus what it
might still become” (90).
	The Kingsley chapter is
where the book intersects with the
study of Victorian imperialism. It
is centered on Kingsley’s travel
narrative, At Last: A Christmas in

the West Indies (1871), which chiefly
charts his travel on and around the
island of Trinidad. For Kingsley,
the West Indies are a gateway to a
South America he longs to visit but
cannot. Although his narrative is
full of natural historical detail, the
memory of the human that he encounters in his journeys is not the
savage, but the ghosts of the
“seadogs” of whom he wrote in his
historical novel Westward Ho!
(1855), as well as the eighteenthand nineteenth-century naturalists
who have journeyed before him. It
is not the species past, but the national-imperial past, that figures
largely in this chapter, a past that
can be revived only in memory.
Kingsley connects his own return
to the West Indies of his childhood
with a return in memory to the
Elizabethan childhood of empire,
the age of exploration of the New
World, making possible, Schmitt
argues, “a reading of the ‘at last’ of
his title as a personal expression of
longing fulfilled that is, at the same
time, a national-corporate expression of destiny accomplished”
(108).
Kingsley’s framing of South
America as a place to remember
the Elizabethan past, the moments
of empire’s youth, as well as a place
that may hold the perpetually deferred imperial future, makes him
very much the exception among
the four figures Schmitt discusses.
But it does give Schmitt a chance
to touch upon the unique relation
of South America to British impe-

	ON schmitt’s darwin
rialism: the way the collapsed
empires of Spain and Portugal
functioned both as negative images
of tyranny against which the English measured themselves and as
admonitions about the fate of empire. While not under British rule,
South America was still subject to
British economic imperialism. And
in an era in which the story of empire was rearticulated to center on
the New World (see John R. Seeley’s reframing in 1881 of the importance of the New World in The
Expansion of England), South America stands out as the part of the
New World the British didn’t acquire, but to which they might
now aspire.
The writer with whom Schmitt
most clearly identifies, however, is
not Kingsley, but W. H. Hudson,
who is, in a way, the hero of this
book, and whose beautiful and
evocative descriptions of lost lands
are often echoed by the cadences of
Schmitt’s own prose. Born in South
America (Buenos Aires), and writing in London about the faraway
land of his childhood, Hudson is
obsessed with loss. Loss comes not
merely with the passage of time or
with geographic distance, but also
in the form of the destruction of
the animal, plant, and human life
of South America. Schmitt calls
Hudson, after Andreas Huyssen, a
“memorian,” someone who recollects the past through memory, and
he argues that Hudson’s use of
memory should resonate for us
with twentieth-century memory
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studies, with their focus on trauma
and destruction:7
This is the keynote of Hudson’s work: the solemn invocation of a lost world as a
form of testimony, protest,
and lament. His memories
of that world often provide
glimpses of plenitude, realizing in imagination and on the
page images of wild beauty.
But they cannot do so without
simultaneously insisting on
past, present, and future catastrophe. This among other
things distinguishes the structure of feeling in Hudson’s
corpus from what might appear to be unmitigated or selfindulgent nostalgia. (124)
Schmitt makes his argument
through readings of three of Hudson’s major works: The Naturalist
in La Plata (1892), Idle Days in Patagonia (1893), and A Hind in Richmond Park (1922). He argues that,
for Hudson, the central dilemma
of evolution is not the problem of
man’s connection to his animal ancestors, but the other problem, the
problem that Darwin says we forget when we behold “the face of
nature bright with gladness”: the
problem of destruction and extinction. When a species is gone, it is
gone forever, never to be repeated.
The only consolation for this loss is
that evolution postulates a relation
between what lives now and everything that has ever lived: the lost
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past lives on in every living organism. In particular, vanishing savages live on in present-day humans,
which is on the one hand “transparently self-serving, rendering
the extermination of indigenous
people’s bearable” and, on the
other, enlists the savage past “in the
service of the recollection of a public, collective memory of wildness
and savagery harnessed to political
ends.” (127)
Ultimately, Schmitt argues,
Hudson proposes a theory of memory and sense perception that is
both Proustian and evolutionary:
that is, Hudson understands human sense perception as both natural and historical, changing over
time. Latent in modern humans
are the more intense senses of sight,
smell, sound, and direction enjoyed by their savage ancestors:
Changes in the human sensorium as well as changes in
the world to be sensed, Hudson maintains, always amount
to loss. Species are passing
away into oblivion, and with
them sights, sounds, scents;
at the same time and partly
as a result, human perceptual
capacities, already much reduced in relation to what they
once were, face continued
atrophy. The intimate interdependence of human perception and that which exists
to be perceived means that to
destroy the latter is, inevitably,
to diminish the former. By the

same token, however, such
interdependence also holds
out the promise of a return
to the lost past. The sound of
Beethoven’s music, the scent
of an evening primrose, the
landscape of Patagonia: all
take one back. By way of the
memories they evoke they effect a return, and a return not
to any distant time but specifically to that of human prehistory. (150)
By making his readers remember
their savage past, Hudson reminds
them that “to destroy wilderness is
to destroy themselves” (151).
The Hudson chapter is full
of references to modernism—to
Proust on the one hand, and to
modernist primitivism on the
other, a primitivism made possible
by various biological and psychological theories about the inner
savage. Schmitt acknowledges the
complicity of primitivism with imperialism, but also wants to argue
for a Hudson who is not merely
nostalgic, but actively engaged in
an ecological political project that
makes vanishing beauty live for its
readers as a way of encouraging
them to take action to preserve the
living things, including people,
that civilization destroys.
In a brief (seven page) coda,
Schmitt sketches out some of the
implications of his argument linking it to twentieth-century memory studies that center on trauma
and to contemporary animal stud-

	ON schmitt’s darwin
ies. For Darwin, Wallace, Kingsley
and Hudson, evolutionary theory
is “both the discovery of and the
response to disaster” (157)—so their
work can be profitably compared,
as Schmitt does, to W. G. Sebald’s
Austerlitz (2001). These Victorian
writers can also be compared to
“thinkers as diverse as Giorgio
Agamben, Donna Harraway, and
Cary Wolfe” (162), who, Schmitt
argues, pose the question of the
animal in ways that focus on the
animal as human or the human as
animal and forget what for the
Victorians comes between:
Of Darwin, and of Wallace,
Kingsley, and Hudson, we
might say instead that they
depict people as though they
were the animals haunted by
the loss of what they imagine comes between them and
other animals—“savages”—
and as though the only way
to free themselves from such
haunting were to remember
that that loss makes them who
they are. (162)
Darwin and the Memory of the
Human is part of a movement in
cultural criticism about Victorian
colonialism and imperialism to
shift the focus away from indicting
the Victorians and towards an understanding of how this experience
restructured England and English
people on every level. Recent work
by John Plotz, James Buzard, and
Christopher Herbert has looked
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beyond the “find the tyranny”
model for other ways of thinking
about culture and imperialism.
Plotz’s Portable Property: Victorian
Culture on the Move (2009) detached the circulation of objects
from the critique of global commodity culture in order to talk
about the different kinds of meanings objects accrue. In Buzard’s
Disorienting Fiction: The Autoethnographic Work of NineteenthCentury British Novels (2005), the
ethnographic gaze that describes,
categorizes, and objectifies the
non-European is supplanted by the
autoethnographic gaze that novels
turn on their own culture. Chris
Herbert’s War of No Pity: The Indian Mutiny and Victorian Trauma
(2007) is interested less in how representations of the Indian Mutiny
fomented racist hysteria in Britain
in support of tyranny than he is in
how the mutiny prompted a dissident, critical, antipatriotic kind of
writing highly critical of British
actions in India. Similarly, rather
than charting the ways in which
evolutionary science’s ideas about
the savage acted in support of imperialist expansion, Schmitt here
looks at a different side of knowledge production and the impact of
that production on the producer.
On the one hand, this kind of work
provides an important supplement
to our existing accounts of empire
in the Victorian period. All of these
scholars are highly critical of imperialism, and the turn in their own
work to the impact of imperialism
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on the British is not meant in the
least to deny its horrors. Yet, on the
other hand, there is and ought to
be something disturbing about the
reimagination of empire as a mode
of self-development for British
people. Read unsympathetically,
not as a supplement to the critique
of the dynamics of domination but
as substitute for it, this work can
seem as though it’s suggesting that
world conquest makes you a better
person.
Schmitt addresses this difficulty
in two ways in the book. He provides constant reminders of the violence of imperialism—even in
relation to South America, where
British imperialism was primarily
financial rather than a matter of
direct rule. But his other way of
addressing the problem is through
the formal structure of the book itself, which operates as a kind of
self-critique. The Kingsley chapter
is the center of this critique. Unlike
Darwin, Wallace, and Hudson,
Kingsley never reaches South
America. Savages therefore do not
occupy the same place in his imaginary: for Kingsley, the human object of memory is historical rather
than natural historical. Kingsley,
in other words, sees savages as utterly distinct from his modern civilized self, and he doesn’t see them
very often. So, in many ways this
chapter is an anomaly in Schmitt’s
book, a disruption in the general
argumentative pull, a pause between Wallace and Hudson when
the book moves away from savages

and history and into the problems
of empire itself. And yet it is also
the essential chapter of the book,
for in his memory of England’s
historical past, of the explorers
whose narratives he has read,
Kingsley turns out to be most like
Schmitt himself. Like Kingsley remembering the savage Elizabethans, Schmitt remembers the
savage Victorians, who, like Kingsley’s Elizabethan sea dogs, con
stitute a past that must be
remembered, is always slipping
away, and is, strangely, memorialized. This is why Kingsley is both
anomalous and also central to this
book. He is the writer most involved in furthering the project of
imperialism, and the vanished past
he remembers is not a savage past,
but an imperial one. He is absolutely necessary to Schmitt’s critique of imperialism, but like
Darwin’s savage, he is also a figure
of great ambivalence. Without
him, there wouldn’t be sufficient
reminder that empire isn’t pretty.
But with him comes the problematic of which savage ancestors
Schmitt wishes to claim and which
to deny. He would like to be Hudson, calling up precious lost savage
Victorians in ways that restore
valuable absent things to a world
that needs them. But there is always the danger that, because after
all Victorians are a lot more like
Elizabethan sea dogs than innocent
savages, he might be calling up lost
empire in a less productive mode
he himself would call nostalgia.

	ON schmitt’s darwin
What I am doing here, in reading an argument that Schmitt’s
book makes through its form
rather than through its content,
points to what is truly astonishing
and unique about this book, and
what makes it radically different
from any other scholarly work I
know. It gives new meaning to the
term “literary criticism” by making its literariness part of its critical
method. The incantatory beauty of
Schmitt’s prose is not an incidental
feature, a decorative belle-lettrism.
Rather it is designed to rerepresent
the lost savage Victorians, to make
them alive in us again, as we read
Schmitt who, like Hudson, calls
forth the ways of dwelling in the
lost past that makes such continuing presence possible. What Kingsley and Schmitt have in common
is a past memorialized in words;
what Hudson and Schmitt have in
common is the production in
words of an affective relation to a
past that you do not even know
you have missed until you read
them. And those words act by producing affect. This is what makes
this book literary criticism and not
conventional cultural studies or
history of science. Schmitt’s book is
about the intersection of ideas and
affect in the works of all four men,
and it embodies and enacts that intersection in the very texture of its
language. Scientists (and humanists) have feelings about thoughts,
as well as thoughts about feeling—
and, in a way, this book works to
re-create or create affect in the
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reader about these ideas. Evidence
here is not just the textual evidence
of scholarly literary criticism, but
also the successful production in
the reader of affect that is also
knowledge. Kingsley points up the
dangers of this enterprise; Hudson
its possibilities.
A recent special issue of Representations on “The Way We Read
Now” poses the question of the
fate of symptomatic reading and
speculates about what other reading practices are taking its place—
surface reading, the archive,
cognitive theory, media studies.8
What for me holds all these modes
together is a longing for the solidity of the visible, the actual, the
material: taking refuge in the actual words of the text, the vast
number of texts in the archive,
thinking as an activity of an embodied brain, the physical medium
of the book or newspaper. The
immateriality of interpretation,
thought, and critique seems to render these modes of thought dangerously flighty, ungrounded, and
insubstantial in a twenty-first century in which everything is mediated. Historicism can recover for
us a world of actualities, and description is a central mode of critical access to that world. Schmitt’s
descriptive prose, his sympathetic
readings of these texts that seek not
to expose their unconscious motivations but to reveal the fullness of
their accomplishment, are part of
this. But Schmitt’s answer to the
problem of immateriality is, like
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that of his subjects, what we might
call “memoricist” rather than historicist. Not the materiality of
Victorian things, but the strange
persistence of Victorian words and
their affective charge in the bodies
of modern readers, is at issue. So
alongside the scholarly argument
of this book about memory and
evolution runs another mode of
conveying ideas entirely, one that
uses literary techniques to produce
in the reader the very structures of
memory and emotion that it claims
in its argument are characteristic
of modernity. The memory of the
memory of the human.
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